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Abstract
We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph. The most
well-known such values are component-efficient and characterized by some link-deletion property.
We study efficient extensions of such values: for a given component-efficient value, we look for
a value that (i) satisfies efficiency, (ii) satisfies the link-deletion property underlying the original
component-efficient value, and (iii) coincides with the original component-efficient value whenever
the underlying graph is connected. Be´al et al. (2015) prove that the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977)
admits a unique efficient extension, which has been introduced by van den Brink et al. (2012). We
pursue this line of research by showing that the average tree solution (Herings et al., 2008) and
the compensation solution (Be´al et al., 2012a) admit similar unique efficient extensions, and that
there exists no efficient extension of the position Value (Meessen, 1988; Borm et al., 1992). As
byproducts, we obtain new characterizations of the average tree solution and the compensation
solution, and of their efficient extensions.
Keywords: Efficient extension, average tree solution, compensation solution, position value,
component fairness, relative fairness, balanced total threats, Myerson value, component-wise
egalitarian solution
2010 MSC: 91A12, JEL: C71
1. Introduction
Cooperative games with transferable utility (henceforth TU-games) describe the worth that
each coalition of players can generate by cooperating. The objective is to find a value, which
rewards the players for participating in the TU-game with a certain payoff. In this classical
model, such a value can only depend (possibly) on the worths of the coalitions of players. The
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Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is the most well-known value for TU-games. However, in many
situations the exogenous affinities among players are represented by some social, hierarchical,
economical, communicational, or technical structure. Two prominent examples are the games with
a coalition structure introduced by Aumann and Dreze (1974) and Owen (1977) and the games
with a communication structure (called CO-games hereafter) proposed by Myerson (1977). In the
first model, the players are organized in a priori unions. In the second model, the communication
among the players are is modeled by the links of an undirected graph. In both models, it is crucial
to evaluate the influence of the exogenous structure on the payoff allocation, and in each of the
above-mentioned articles, the Shapley value is generalized in a specific way. For games with a
coalition structure, two interpretations coexist since the beginning. On the one hand, Aumann
and Dreze (1974) propose a value that is component-efficient: the players only share the worth of
their own a priori union. On the other hand, Owen (1977) introduces an efficient value, which is
motivated by Hart and Kurz (1983, p.1048) as follows:
“(...) outcomes are “overall efficient”, no matter the players are organized. Thus,
we assume as a postulate that society as a whole operates efficiently; the problem we
address here is how are the benefits distributed among the participants. With this view
in mind, coalitions do not form in order to obtain their “worth” and then “leave” the
game. But rather, they “stay” in the game and bargain as a unit with all the other
players.”
The Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) can be considered as the counterpart for CO-games of the value
suggested by Aumann and Dreze (1974) for games with a coalition structure. It is component-
efficient: the players only share the worth of their own component of the graph. This property is also
satisfied by numerous values for CO-games (henceforth CO-values) that appeared consequently in
the literature such as the position value (Meessen, 1988; Borm et al., 1992), the average tree solution
(Herings et al., 2008) and the compensation solution (Be´al et al., 2012a). All such CO-values are
characterized by component efficiency and an appealing link deletion property which reflects the
payoff variation of some players when some links are removed from the graph. Surprisingly, for
CO-games, counterparts of the value proposed by Owen (1977) have been less popular so far and
only appeared recently (see Casajus, 2007; Hamiache, 2012; Be´al et al., 2012b; van den Brink et al.,
2012).
In this article, we introduce new efficient CO-values that are efficient extensions of well-known
component-efficient CO-values. More specifically, for a given component-efficient CO-value, an effi-
cient extension is any CO-value which (i) is efficient, (ii) satisfies the link deletion property charac-
terizing the original component-efficient CO-value, and (iii) coincides with the original component-
efficient CO-value whenever the underlying graph is connected. This approach has been initiated
by Be´al et al. (2015), in which it is shown that the Myerson value admits a unique efficient ex-
tension: the CO-value studied by van den Brink et al. (2012). We show that the average tree
solution and the Compensation admit unique efficient extensions (Theorems 4 and 6, respectively).
Moreover, these efficient extensions can be constructed similarly to the efficient extension of the
Myerson value: each player receives his payoff according to the corresponding component-efficient
CO-value plus an equal share of the surplus of worth generated by the grand coalition compared
to the total worth achieved by the components of the graph.
These results seem to suggest that an efficient extension always exists, is unique, and is always
built by means of the previous construction. We show that these assertions are not all valid.
Firstly, we prove that there does not exist any efficient extension of the position value (Theorem
2
8). Secondly, we conclude the article by showing that the component-wise egalitarian solution
characterized by Slikker (2007) admits a unique efficient extension, but that it is not constructed
by evenly splitting surplus produced by the grand coalition compared to the total worth achieved
by the components of the graph in addition to the component-wise egalitarian solution.
Our (possibility) results are obtained by means of new axiomatic characterizations of the av-
erage tree solution and the compensation solution on the domain of connected cycle-free graphs
(Propositions 1 and 2, respectively). These characterizations are also adapted to provide axiomatic
characterizations of their efficient extensions (parts (ii) in Theorems 4 and 6).
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries, the definition
of an efficient extension, and exposes a result from Be´al et al. (2015). Sections 3 and 4 provide
all the material on the average tree solution and the compensation solution, respectively. Section
5 proves the impossibility result about the position value. Section 6 concludes by a discussion on
the unique efficient extension of the component-wise egalitarian solution.
2. Cooperative games and graphs
Fix an infinite set U, the universe of players, and let N denote the set of non-empty and finite
subsets of U.
2.1. Cooperative games with transferable utilities
A TU-game is a pair pN, vq consisting of a set of players N P N and a coalition function
v P tf : 2N ÝÑ R | fpHq “ 0u, where 2N denotes the power set of N . Subsets of N are called
coalitions, and vpSq is called the worth of coalition S. For any TU-game pN, vq and any S Ď N ,
the sub-game of pN, vq induced by S is denoted by pS, v|Sq, where v|S is the restriction of v to 2S .
A TU-game pN, vq is zero-normalized if vptiuq “ 0 for all i P N .
A value on N is an operator ϕ that assigns a payoff vector ϕpN, vq P RN to any TU-game
pN, vq. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is the value given by
SHi pN, vq “
ÿ
SĎNztiu
1
|N | ¨
ˆ|N | ´ 1
|S|
˙´1
¨ pv pS Y tiuq ´ v pSqq
for all TU-games pN, vq and i P N .
2.2. Graphs
A communication graph for N P N is an undirected graph pN,Lq, where L Ď LN :“
tti, ju |i, j P N, i ‰ ju. A typical element (link) of L is written as ij :“ ti, ju. Player’s i, j P N
are called connected in pN,Lq if there is a sequence of players pi1, i2, . . . , ikq, k P N, k ą 1 from
N such that i1 “ i, ik “ j, and i`i``1 P L for all ` P t1, . . . , k ´ 1u . It is clear that connectedness
is an equivalence relation. Hence, it induces a partition C pN,Lq of N , the set of components of
pN,Lq , such that C P C pN,Lq, i, j P C, k P NzC, i ‰ j implies that i and j are connected and
that i and k are not connected in pN,Lq . The component of pN,Lq containing i P N is denoted
by Ci pN,Lq . The graph pN,Lq is called connected if C pN,Lq “ tNu. A link ij P L is called a
bridge in pN,Lq if C pN,Lq ‰ C pN,Lz tijuq. For S Ď N and L Ď LN , set L|S :“ tij P L|i, j P Su.
A graph pN,Lq is cycle-free if each ij P L is a bridge, and each of its components is called a tree.
A directed graph for N P N is pair pN,Dq , D Ď DN :“ pN ˆNqz tpi, iq | i P Nu ; pi, jq P DN
is called a directed link from i to j. For any cycle-free graph pN,Lq and any C P CpN,Lq, each
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player r P C induces a rooted spanning tree on C, i.e., a directed graph that arises from the
tree pC,L|Cq by directing all links away from the root r. If a spanning tree rooted at r contains
a directed link pi, jq, then j is a called a successor of i. Denote by srpiq the possibly empty set
of successors of player i P C in the spanning tree rooted at r. A player j is a subordinate of i if
there is a directed path from i to j, i.e., if there is a sequence of distinct players pi1, . . . , ikq, k P N,
k ą 1 from N such that i1 “ i, ik “ j, and, for each ` “ t1, . . . , k ´ 1u, i``1 P srpi`q. The set Srpiq
denotes the union of all subordinates of i in the spanning tree rooted at r and i.
2.3. Communication games
A CO-game is a triple pN, v, Lq, where pN, vq is a TU-game and L Ď LN . We denote by G the
set of all such CO-games. A CO-game is called connected if the associated graph is connected, and
cycle-free is the associated graph is cycle-free. We denote by GC Ď G, GCF Ď G and G0 Ă G the
classes of all connected CO-games, of all cycle-free CO-games, and of all zero-normalized
CO-games respectively. A CO-value on some class of CO-games G˚ Ď G is an operator ϕ that
assigns a payoff vector ϕpN, v, Lq P RN to every CO-game pN, v, Lq P G˚.
The Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) is the CO-value on G given by
MY pN, v, Lq :“ SH `N, vL˘ , vL pSq :“ ÿ
TPCpS,L|Sq
v pT q , S Ď N
It is characterized by component efficiency and fairness. Throughout this article, we sometimes
invoke axioms on different subclasses of CO-games indicated by “|G˚” in their definition. For any
such subclass, all the CO-games used in the axiom belong to the subclass. If an axiom is invoked
on a unique class of CO-games or if G˚ “ G, we omit this indicator.
Component efficiency, CE|G˚. For all pN, v, Lq P G˚ and C P CpN,Lq,ÿ
iPC
ϕipN, v, Lq “ vpCq.
Fairness, F. For all pN, v, Lq P G, and ij P L,
ϕi pN, v, Lq ´ ϕi pN, v, Lz tijuq “ ϕj pN, v, Lq ´ ϕj pN, v, Lz tijuq .
Component efficiency states that the worth of each component of the graph is distributed
among its members. Fairness requires that removing a link from the graph changes the payoffs of
the players forming this link by the same amount.
Theorem 1. (Myerson, 1977) The Myerson value is the unique CO-value on G that satisfies com-
ponent efficiency (CE) and fairness (F).
2.4. Efficient extensions
The axiom of component efficiency is natural if the communication among the players in the
communication graph is interpreted as a necessity to generate worth. Another plausible interpreta-
tion is that the generation of worth is not constrained by the communication graph, which is simply
used to evaluate the a priori affinities among the players in order to provide a payoff allocation.
Under this alternative interpretation, the axiom of efficiency below is natural.
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Efficiency, E|G˚. For all pN, v, Lq P G˚,ÿ
iPN
ϕipN, v, Lq “ vpNq.
Let ψ be any CO-value characterized on some class of CO-games G˚ by component efficiency
and some link deletion property denoted by LDPψ. The efficient extension of ψ is a CO-value ϕ
on G˚ such that
(i) ϕ satisfies efficiency (E|G˚),
(ii) ϕ satisfies the link deletion property LDPψ|G˚ ,
(iii) ϕ coincides with ψ on G˚ X GC .
Point (i) means that ϕ is efficient while ψ is component efficient. Point (ii) means that ϕ and
ψ both satisfy the link deletion property which is characteristic of ψ. Point (iii) means that ϕ and
ψ prescribe the same payoff vector in all CO-games in G˚ where the graph is connected, i.e., where
efficiency and component efficiency are the same condition. All in all, this means that ϕ is very
close to ψ, somehow the CO-value closest to ψ among the efficient CO-values as will be explained
later.
The first efficient extension has been proposed by van den Brink et al. (2012) for the Myerson
value. We call it the efficient egalitarian Myerson value EEMY, given by
EEMYi pN, v, Lq :“ MYi pN, v, Lq ` v pNq ´ v
LpNq
|N |
for all CO-games pN, v, Lq P G, and i P N .
Be´al et al. (2015) show that EEMY is the unique efficient extension of the Myerson value.
Theorem 2. (Be´al et al., 2015) The efficient egalitarian Myerson value EEMY is the unique
efficient extension of the Myerson value, i.e., ϕ satisfies ϕ “ MY on GC and meets efficiency (E)
and fairness (F), if and only if ϕ “ EEMY on G.
In the next three sections, we study the efficient extensions of three other CO-values: the
average tree solution, the compensation solution, and the position value.
3. The average tree solution: characterizations and a unique efficient extension
For all pN, v, Lq P GCF , all C P CpN,Lq, and r P C, Demange (2004) defines the hierarchical
outcome for the spanning tree on C rooted at r as:
mri pN, v, Lq “ vpSrpiqq ´
ÿ
jPsrpiq
vpSrpjqq
for each i P C. The average tree solution AT introduced by Herings et al. (2008) is the CO-value
on GCF that assigns to each cycle-free CO-game and to each player the average of his hierarchical
outcomes:
ATipN, v, Lq “ 1|CipN,Lq|
ÿ
rPCipN,Lq
mri pN, v, Lq
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for all pN, v, Lq P GCF , and i P N . They use component efficiency and component fairness below
in order to characterize the average tree solution for cycle-free CO-games.
Component fairness, CF. For all pN, v, Lq P GCF , and ij P L,ÿ
kPCipN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ϕkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CipN,Lztijuq| “
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ϕkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CjpN,Lztijuq| .
Component fairness states that deleting a link between two players yields for both resulting
new components the same per-capita change in payoffs.
Theorem 3. (Herings et al., 2008) The average tree solution is the unique CO-value on GCF that
satisfies component efficiency (CE|GCF ) and component fairness (CF).
In this section, we show that the average tree solution admits a unique efficient extension. This
result will be the consequence of other results, which are analogous of those in Be´al et al. (2015)
for the Myerson value. In order to understand the average tree solution as an efficient CO-value
for connected and cycle-free CO-games, we begin by invoking the following property.
Connected component fairness, CCF. For all pN, v, Lq P GCF X GC and ij P L,ÿ
kPCipN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ϕkpCipN,Lztijuq, v|CipN,Lztijuq, Lztiju|CipN,Lztijuqq
|CipN,Lztijuq|
“
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ϕkpCjpN,Lztijuq, v|CjpN,Lztijuq, Lztiju|CjpN,Lztijuqq
|CjpN,Lztijuq| .
Similarly to component fairness, connected component fairness considers the average change of
the payoffs of the components of two players i and j if the link ij is removed. Connected compo-
nent fairness compares the original payoffs with the payoffs obtained if the CO-game is restricted
to each player’s component, respectively, and imposes an equal average payoff variation. Note
that all graphs involved in this axiom are connected and cycle-free. We suggest the following
characterization of the average tree solution on the class of connected and cycle-free CO-games.
Proposition 1. A CO-value ϕ on GCF X GC satisfies efficiency (E|GCFXGC ) and connected com-
ponent fairness (CCF) if and only if ϕ “ AT on GCF X GC .
Proof. By construction, AT satisfies E|GCFXGC . Concerning CCF, recall first that for a CO-game
pN, v, Lq P GCF , a component C P CpN,Lq, and a player i P C, the payoff assigned by AT to player
i only relies on the worths of some coalitions in 2C by the definition of all hierarchical outcomes.
This means that AT satisfies the axiom of component decomposability1(van den Nouweland, 1993,
pp. 28-29). As a consequence, for any link ij P L, it holds that both
ATkpN, v, Lztijuq “ ATkpCipN,Lztijuq, v|CipN,Lztijuq, Lztiju|CipN,Lztijuqq
1Component decomposability, CD|G˚ . For all pN, v, Lq P G˚, C P CpN,Lq, and i P C such that pC, v|C , L|Cq P
G˚, we have ϕi pN, v, Lq “ ϕi pC, v|C , L|Cq.
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for all k P CipN,Lztijuq and
ATkpN, v, Lztijuq “ ATkpCjpN,Lztijuq, v|CjpN,Lztijuq, Lztiju|CjpN,Lztijuqq
for all k P CjpN,Lztijuq. Using these equalities and the fact that AT satisfies CF, we obtainÿ
kPCipN,Lztijuq
ATkpN, v, Lq ´ATkpCipN,Lztijuq, v|CipN,Lztijuq, Lztiju|CipN,Lztijuqq
|CipN,Lztijuq|
“
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lztijuq
ATkpN, v, Lq ´ATkpCjpN,Lztijuq, v|CjpN,Lztijuq, Lztiju|CjpN,Lztijuqq
|CjpN,Lztijuq| .
for all pN, v, Lq P GCF and ij P L. Since this condition holds for all pN, v, Lq P GCF , it obviously
holds for all pN, v, Lq P GCF X GC , which means that AT satisfies CCF.
It remains to show that if a CO-value ϕ on GCFXGC satisfies the two axioms, then it is uniquely
determined. This part of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4 of Herings et al. (2008).
Thus, we only sketch the proof by induction on the cardinality of the player set. For a CO-game
pN, v, Lq P GCF X GC such that |N | “ 1, E|GCFXGC uniquely determines ϕ. Now, suppose that ϕ
is uniquely determined for all pN, v, Lq P GCF X GC such that |N | ă n and consider a CO-game
pN, v, Lq P GCFXGC such that |N | “ n. Applying CCF, E|GCFXGC , and the induction hypothesis as
in proof of Theorem 3.4 of Herings et al. (2008), we get a system of linearly independent equations
as desired. ˝
In the next Theorem, we prove that there exists a unique efficient extension of the average tree
solution for cycle-free CO-games. In other words, there exists a unique CO-value that satisfies
efficiency and component fairness and that coincides with the average tree solution for connected
cycle-free CO-games. We call this value the efficient egalitarian average tree solution EEAT
that is defined by
EEATipN, v, Lq :“ ATipN, v, Lq ` vpNq ´ v
LpNq
|N |
for all pN, v, Lq P GCF , and i P N . Moreover, we give a concise characterization of the efficient
egalitarian average tree solution.
Theorem 4. (i) A CO-value ϕ on GCF satisfies efficiency (E|GCF ), component fairness (CF),
and ϕ “ AT on GCF X GC if and only if ϕ “ EEAT on GCF .
(ii) A CO-value ϕ on GCF satisfies efficiency (E|GCF ), component fairness (CF), and connected
component fairness (CCF) if and only if ϕ “ EEAT.
The proof of Theorem 4 is based on the following lemma, which states that if two CO-values for
cycle-free CO-games satisfy efficiency, component fairness, and agree on connected cycle-free CO-
games, then they must assign the same total payoff to all components of a graph in all cycle-free
CO-games.
Lemma 1. Let ϕ and ψ be two CO-values on GCF that satisfy efficiency (E|GCF ) and component
fairness (CF). If ϕ “ ψ on GCF X GC , then řiPC ϕipN, v, Lq “ řiPC ψipN, v, Lq for all pN, v, Lq P
GCF and all C P CpN,Lq.
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Proof. Let ϕ and ψ be two CO-values for cycle-free CO-games that satisfy E|GCF and CF and
suppose that ϕpN, v, Lq “ ψpN, v, Lq for all pN, v, Lq P GCF X GC . The result follows by E|GCF on
connected cycle-free CO-games. So, consider any cycle-free CO-game pN, v, Lq P GCF zGC , which
implies |CpN,Lq| ą 1. Suppose that there is a cycle-free CO-game in which ϕ and ψ do not assign
the same total payoff to some component. More specifically, consider pN, v, Lq P GCF zGC with
a maximal L Ď LN such that řiPC ϕipN, v, Lq ‰ řiPC ψipN, v, Lq for some C P CpN,Lq. Since
|CpN,Lq| ą 1, we can consider distinct players i, j P N such that i P C and j P NzC. By CF, the
maximality of L, and the initial assumption, we getř
kPC ϕkpN, v, Lq
|C| ´
ř
kPCjpN,Lq ϕkpN, v, Lq
|CjpN,Lq|
“
ř
kPC ϕkpN, v, LY tijuq
|C| ´
ř
kPCjpN,Lq ϕkpN, v, LY tijuq
|CjpN,Lq|
“
ř
kPC ψkpN, v, LY tijuq
|C| ´
ř
kPCjpN,Lq ψkpN, v, LY tijuq
|CjpN,Lq|
“
ř
kPC ϕkpN, v, Lq
|C| ´
ř
kPCjpN,Lq ϕkpN, v, Lq
|CjpN,Lq| .
Equivalently, the latter equality can be written as
|CjpN,Lq|
|C|
ÿ
kPC
pϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ψkpN, v, Lqq “
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lq
pϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ψkpN, v, Lqq .
Summing the last expression on all CjpN,Lq in CpN,Lq and using E|GCF yieldsÿ
CjpN,LqPCpN,Lq
|CjpN,Lq|
|C|
ÿ
kPC
pϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ψkpN, v, Lqq
“
ÿ
CjpN,LqPCpN,Lq
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lq
pϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ψkpN, v, Lqq
ðñ |N ||C|
ÿ
kPC
pϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ψkpN, v, Lqq “
ÿ
kPN
pϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ψkpN, v, Lqq
ðñ
ÿ
kPC
pϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ψkpN, v, Lqq E|GCF“ 0,
a contradiction that proves the result. ˝
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof. (Theorem 4) (i) EEAT satisfies E|GCF and coincides with AT on connected cycle-free
CO-games by construction, as well as inherits CF from AT. For the uniqueness part, consider any
CO-value ϕ on GCF that satisfies the two axioms and that coincides with AT for connected cycle-
free CO-games. By definition of EEAT, for any pN, v, Lq P GCF X GC , it holds that ϕpN, v, Lq “
ATpN, v, Lq “ EEATpN, v, Lq. Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that for all pN, v, Lq P GCF and all
C P CpN,Lq, we have řiPC ϕipN, v, Lq “ řiPC EEATipN, v, Lq. In particular, if L “ H, then
CpN,Lq “ ttiu, i P Nu and thus ϕpN, v, Lq “ EEATpN, v, Lq. This proves that ϕ is uniquely
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determined for all cycle-free CO-games with an empty graph. It remains to consider cycle-free
CO-games with a non-empty graph. So pick any pN, v, Lq P GCF , L ‰ H, and any ij P L. By CF,
it holds thatÿ
kPCipN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ϕkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CipN,Lztijuq| “
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lq ´ ϕkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CjpN,Lztijuq| . (1)
Since tCipN,Lztijuq, CjpN,Lztijuqu Ď CpN,Lztijuq, Lemma 1 implies that bothÿ
kPCipN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lztijuq “
ÿ
kPCipN,Lztijuq
EEATkpN, v, Lztijuq
and ÿ
kPCjpN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lztijuq “
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lztijuq
EEATkpN, v, Lztijuq.
Therefore, (1) becomes:ÿ
kPCipN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lq ´ EEATkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CipN,Lztijuq| “
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lq ´ EEATkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CjpN,Lztijuq| .
It is useful to express this equality as:ř
kPCjpN,Lztijuq ϕkpN, v, Lq
|CipN,Lztijuq| ´
ř
kPCjpN,Lztijuq ϕkpN, v, Lq
|CjpN,Lztijuq|
“
ř
kPCjpN,Lztijuq EEATkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CipN,Lztijuq| ´
ř
kPCjpN,Lztijuq EEATkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CjpN,Lztijuq| (2)
There are |L| “ |N | ´ |CpN,Lq| equations of type (2). Furthermore, for each C P CpN,Lq, we also
know from Lemma 1 that ÿ
iPC
ϕipN, v, Lq “
ÿ
iPC
EEATipN, v, Lq. (3)
There are |CpN,Lq| equations of type (3). All in all, we obtain a system of |N | equations. The
left-hand sides of this system and of the system with a unique solution obtained by Herings et al.
(2008, proof of Theorem 3.4) are identical. Since only the right-hand side is different in our system,
it also has a unique solution.
(ii) One easily checks that EEAT obeys CCF. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 1, Theorem 4 (i),
and Proposition 1. ˝
Remark 1. The characterization of the efficient egalitarian average tree solution in Theorem 4 (ii)
is non-redundant. The Null value assigning a null payoff to all players in all CO-games satisfies
component fairness and connected component fairness but not efficiency. The egalitarian value
EV defined as
EVipN, v, Lq “ vpNq|N |
for all pN, v, Lq P G and i P N satisfies efficiency and component fairness but not connected
component fairness. The CO-value ϕz given by
ϕzi pN, v, Lq “ ATi pvq ` v pNq ´ v
L pNq
|CpN,Lq| ¨ |Ci pN,Lq|
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for all pN, v, Lq P G and i P N satisfies efficiency and connected component fairness but not
component fairness.
4. The compensation solution: characterizations and a unique efficient extension
The compensation solution has been introduced in Be´al et al. (2012a) for cycle-free CO-games.
It is build from the compensation vectors defined as follows. For each CO-game pN, v, Lq P GCF ,
each component C P CpN,Lq, and each spanning tree rooted at r on C, define the compensation
vector as
cri pN, v, Lq “
ÿ
jPC:iPSrj
vpSrj q
|Srj |
´
ÿ
jPC:iPCzSrj
vpSrj q
|CzSrj |
(4)
for all i P N . Firstly, the contribution of player i P C consists in sharing equally the worth vpCq
with the other members of component C. Then, for each coalition Srj , j P Cztru, formed according
to the partial order of the spanning tree rooted at r, player i receives a share vpSrj q{|Srj | if he
belongs to this coalition or pays vpSrj q{|CzSrj | otherwise. On GCF , the compensation solution
CS is defined as the average over all rooted spanning trees of the contribution vector (4). Formally,
CSipN, v, Lq “ 1|CipN,Lq|
ÿ
rPCipN,Lq
cri pN, v, Lq (5)
for all pN, v, Lq P GCF and i P N . Be´al et al. (2012a) characterize the compensation solution by
component efficiency and relative fairness.
Relative fairness, RF. For all pN, v, Lq P GCF , and ij P L,
ϕipN, v, Lq ´
ÿ
kPCipN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CipN,Lztijuq| “ ϕjpN, v, Lq ´
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lztijuq
ϕkpN, v, Lztijuq
|CjpN,Lztijuq| .
Relative fairness can be interpreted in the context of the merging of components CipN,Lztijuq
and CjpN,Lztijuq through a new link ij. The axiom says that the payoff variation of players i
and j with respect to the per-capita payoff in their pre-existing components CipN,Lztijuq and
CipN,Lztijuq should be the same.
Theorem 5. (Be´al et al., 2012a) The compensation solution CS is the unique CO-value that sat-
isfies component efficiency (CE|GCF ) and relative fairness (RF).
The method developed in Be´al et al. (2015) for the Myerson value and in the previous section for
the average tree solution also works to construct the unique efficient extension of the compensation
solution and to provide new characterizations of the compensation solution. Since the proof of
the results in this section exploits similar arguments, we omit them and make them available
upon request. We start by a characterization of the compensation solution on connected cycle-free
CO-games by relying on the following axiom.
Connected relative fairness, CRF. For all pN, v, Lq P GCF X GC and ij P L,
ϕipN, v, Lq ´
ÿ
kPCipN,Lztijuq
ϕkpCipN,Lztiju, v|CipN,Lztiju, Lztiju|CipN,Lztijuq
|CipN,Lztijuq|
“ ϕjpN, v, Lq ´
ÿ
kPCjpN,Lztijuq
ϕkpCjpN,Lztiju, v|CjpN,Lztiju, Lztiju|CjpN,Lztijuq
|CjpN,Lztijuq| .
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Connected relative fairness is similar to relative fairness except that after deleting link ij, the
CO-game is restricted to each player’s component, respectively. Thus, all graphs involved in this
axiom are connected and cycle-free.
Proposition 2. A CO-value ϕ on GCF XGC satisfies efficiency (E|GCFXGC ) and connected relative
fairness (CRF) if and only if ϕ “ CS on GCF X GC .
Next, we show that the compensation solution admits a unique efficient extension, which we
call the efficient egalitarian compensation solution. As for the Myerson value and the average tree
solution, this CO-value is obtained by adding an equal share of the surplus created between the
components,
`
v pNq ´ vL pNq˘ { |N |, to the compensation solution. More specifically, the efficient
egalitarian compensation solution EECS is defined by
EECSipN, v, Lq :“ CSipN, v, Lq ` vpNq ´ v
LpNq
|N |
for all pN, v, Lq P GCF and i P N . The next theorem also provides a characterization of the efficient
egalitarian compensation solution.2
Theorem 6. (i) A CO-value ϕ on GCF satisfies efficiency (E|GCF ), relative fairness (RF), and
ϕ “ CS on GCF X GC if and only if ϕ “ EECS on GCF .
(ii) A CO-value ϕ on GCF satisfies efficiency (E|GCF ), relative fairness (RF), and connected
relative fairness (CRF) if and only if ϕ “ EECS.
Remark 2. The characterization of the efficient egalitarian compensation solution in Theorem 6 (ii)
is non-redundant. The null value assigning a null payoff to all player in all CO-games satisfies
relative fairness and connected relative fairness but not efficiency. The egalitarian value EV de-
fined in Remark 1 satisfies efficiency and relative fairness but not connected relative fairness. The
CO-value ϕ¯ given by
ϕ¯i pN, v, Lq “ CSi pvq `
v pNq ´ vL pNq
|CpN,Lq| ¨ |Ci pN,Lq|
for all pN, v, Lq P G and i P N satisfies efficiency and connected component fairness but not relative
fairness.
Remark 3. Among all the efficient CO-values, the efficient extensions of the average tree solution
and of the compensation solution uniquely minimize the euclidean distance to the average tree
solution and the compensation solution, respectively. More specifically, it is straightforward to
show that
EEATpN, v, Lq “ argmin
xPRN :řiPN xi“vpNqd px,ATpN, v, Lqq
and
EECSpN, v, Lq “ argmin
xPRN :řiPN xi“vpNqd px,CSpN, v, Lqq
2The proof of the Theorem also makes use of a lemma, which proves that if two CO-values for cycle-free CO-games
satisfy efficiency, relative fairness, and agree on connected cycle-free CO-games, then they must assign the same total
payoff to all components of a graph in all cycle-free CO-games.
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for all pN, v, Lq P G, where d px, yq :“ ařiPN pxi ´ yiq2 denotes the Euclidean distance between
x P RN and y P RN . This property provides a supplementary evidence that these two efficient
extensions can be considered as very close to their original component-efficient CO-values.
5. The position value: an impossibility result
The position value is introduced by Meessen (1988) and Borm et al. (1992). For any pN, v, Lq P
G0, the associated link game is the TU-game pL, rvq such that
rvpAq :“ vApNq “
ÿ
SPCpN,Aq
vpSq, A Ď L.
This link game is a TU-game in which the players can be identified with the links in the original
CO-game. The worth of a coalition of players A in the link game is the total worth generated
by the components of graph pN,Aq. The link game is well-defined: rvpHq “ 0 because pN, vq is
zero-normalized. The position value is the CO-value PV that assigns to each player half of the
Shapley value of each of its links in the link game, that is,
PVipN, v, Lq :“
ÿ
kPN :ikPL
1
2
SHikpL, rvq
for all pN, v, Lq P G0 and i P N . Slikker (2005) characterizes the position value by component
efficiency and balanced total threats.
Balanced total threats, BTT. (Slikker, 2005) For all pN, v, Lq P G0 and i, j P N ,ÿ
kPN :jkPL
pϕipN, v, Lq ´ ϕipN, v, Lztjkuqq “
ÿ
kPN :ikPL
pϕjpN, v, Lq ´ ϕjpN, v, Lztikuqq .
Balanced total threats says that the total threat of any player towards another player equals to
the total threat of that player towards the first player, where the total threat of a player towards
another player is the sum over all links of the first player of payoff differences the second player
experiences if such a link is broken.
Theorem 7. (Slikker, 2005) The position value PV is the unique CO-value that satisfies compo-
nent efficiency (CE|G0) and balanced total threats (BTT).
It is easy to check that the CO-value defined by assigning every player pvpNq´vLpNqq{|N | plus
his/her payoff according to the position value satisfies efficiency and coincides with the position
value whenever the underlying graph is connected. However, it does not satisfy balanced total
threats. This means that the method used to construct the unique efficient extension of the
Myerson value, the average tree solution and the compensation Solution does not yield the efficient
extension of the position Value. Below, a stronger result is demonstrated: there does not exist any
efficient extension of the position Value.
Theorem 8. There does not exists any efficient extension of the position value, i.e., no value ϕ
on G0 satisfies ϕ “ PV on G0XGC and meets efficiency (E|G0) and balanced total threats (BTT).
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Proof. We proceed by contradiction. So assume that there is a CO-value ϕ on G0 that satisfies
ϕ “ PV on G0 X GC , E|G0 , and BTT. Consider any player set N such that |N | ě 4, and without
any loss of generality, assume that t1, 2, 3u Ă N . Pick player 1 P N in order to show that ϕ is not
well-defined in the CO-game pN, v, Lq where L “ LNzt1u. In graph pN,Lq, player 1 has no link
and the subgraph pNzt1u, LpNzt1uqq induced by pN,Lq on Nzt1u is complete. First, note that any
graph pN,L1q such that |L1| “ |L| ` 1 and L1 Ą L is connected, i.e., adding any missing link to the
unconnected graph pN,Lq yields a connected graph. Of course, any such added link is of the form
1i for some i P Nzt1u.
Next, we consider the CO-game pN, v, L Y 12q in order to compute ϕpN, v, Lq. According to
the previous remark, pN,L Y 12q is a connected graph, or equivalently, pN, v, L Y 12q P G0 X GC .
Another important property is that, for all links ij P L, the graph pN, pL Y 12qzijq remains
connected since |Nzt1u| ě 3 and pNzt1u, LpNzt1uqq is a complete graph (in other words, no link
in pNzt1u, LpNzt1uqq is a bridge). Therefore, pN, v, pL Y 12qzijq P G0 X GC as well. Now, let us
apply BTT to all pairs of players t1, iu, i P Nzt1u. Two cases are possible. For i “ 2, we getÿ
jPNzt2u
pϕ1pN, v, LY 12q ´ ϕ1pN, v, pLY 12qz2jqq “ ϕ2pN, v, LY 12q ´ ϕ2pN, v, Lq.
Since ϕ “ PV on G0 X GC , the previous expression can be rewritten as:
p|N |´1qPV1pN, v, LY12q´ϕ1pN, v, Lq´
ÿ
jPNzt1,2u
PV1pN, v, pLY12qz2jq “ PV2pN, v, LY12q´ϕ2pN, v, Lq,
or equivalently,
ϕ1pN, v, Lq´ϕ2pN, v, Lq “ p|N |´1qPV1pN, v, LY12q´
ÿ
jPNzt1,2u
PV1pN, v, pLY12qz2jq´PV2pN, v, LY12q.
Observe that the right-hand side of this expression is uniquely determined, and more importantly,
that it has been obtained by invoking BTT and the fact that ϕ “ PV on G0 X GC only. This
means that this equality holds for every CO-value satisfying BTT and that coincides with PV on
G0 X GC . Since the position value is obviously one such CO-value, it must be that
ϕ1pN, v, Lq ´ ϕ2pN, v, Lq “ PV1pN, v, Lq ´ PV2pN, v, Lq. (6)
Similarly, for all i P Nzt1, 2u, the application of BTT to the pair of players t1, iu yieldsÿ
jPNztiu
pϕ1pN, v, LY 12q ´ ϕpN, v, pLY 12qzijq “ ϕipN, v, LY 12q ´ ϕipN, v, Lq.
Using once again the fact that ϕ “ PV on G0 X GC , we can rewrite the previous expression as
ϕipN, v, Lq “ PVipN, v, LY 12q `
ÿ
jPNztiu
PV1pN, v, pLY 12qzijq ´ p|N | ´ 1qPV1pN, v, LY 12q.
For the same reason as above (i.e., the case where i “ 2), this equality is also true for the position
value, so that we can write
ϕipN, v, Lq “ PVipN, v, Lq (7)
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for all i P Nzt1, 2u. Furthermore, since ϕ satisfies E|G0 , it holds that
ř
iPN ϕipN, v, Lq “ vpNq,
and by using both (7) and the fact that PV is component-efficient in the CO-game pN, v, Lq, the
previous efficiency condition is equivalent to
ϕ1pN, v, Lq ` ϕ2pN, v, Lq “ vpNq ´ vLpNq ` PV1pN, v, Lq ` PV2pN, v, Lq. (8)
It is easy to see that the unique solution of the system of two equations formed by (6) and (8) is
ϕipN, v, Lq “ PVipN, v, Lq ` 1
2
`
vpNq ´ vLpNq˘ (9)
for all i P t1, 2u.
For the final step of the proof, repeat the above procedure in the CO-game pN, v, L Y 13q
instead of the CO-game pN, v, L Y 12q, and obtain ϕipN, v, Lq “ PVipN, v, Lq for all i P Nzt1, 3u
and ϕipN, v, Lq “ PVipN, v, Lq`pvpNq´vLpNqq{2 for each i P t1, 3u. Provided that vpNq ‰ vLpNq,
note that ϕ2pN, v, Lq has two different values according to whether the original CO-game to which
BTT is applied is pN, v, LY 12q or pN, v, LY 13q, a contradiction. This completes the proof. ˝
6. Concluding remarks
This article has extended the approach initiated by Be´al et al. (2015) on the efficient extension
of communication values. Combined with the results in Be´al et al. (2015), our findings suggest that
whenever an efficient extension of a component-efficient CO-value exists, it is unique and assigns
to each player an equal share of the surplus created by the grand coalition in addition to its payoff
according to the component-efficient CO-value. This is not always the case. To see this, consider
the component-wise egalitarian solution CW defined on G as
CWipN, v, Lq “ vpCipN,Lqq|CipN,Lq|
for all pN, v, Lq P G and i P N . Slikker (2007) characterizes component-wise egalitarian solution
by component efficiency and balanced component contributions.3
Balanced component contributions, BCC. For all pN, v, Lq P G and i, j P N ,
ϕipN, v, Lq ´ ϕipN, v, LzLpCjpN,Lqqq “ ϕjpN, v, Lq ´ ϕjpN, v, LzLpCipN,Lqqq
This axiom states that the payoff variation experienced by a first player when all links in the
component of a second player are severed is identical to payoff variation of the second player when
all links in the component of the first player are deleted. Now, consider the egalitarian value EV
defined in Remark 1. This CO-value is an efficient extension of the component-wise egalitarian
solution. Indeed, it trivially coincides with CW for connected CO-games, satisfies efficiency and
balanced component contributions. The latter property drops from the fact that EV is not sensitive
to L. Nonetheless, EV is not obtained by adding to CW an equal share of the surplus vpNq´vLpNq.
Furthermore, it is not difficult to show that there is no other efficient extension of the component-
wise egalitarian solution. As a consequence, if an efficient extension exists, the question of whether
it is always unique remains open.
3In Slikker (2007), this result is given for the larger class of network games. We adapt it here to the class of all
CO-games.
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